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Executive Interview
Interview with Mitchell Ziets for IJSF
Interview conducted by Dr. Daniel Rascher

Mitchell Ziets is the President and CEO of MZ Sports LLC
(http://www.mzsports.com). Over the past 17 years, he
has developed and implemented financing plans for a
number of sport facilities nationwide. Because of the
media scrutiny and controversy that often surround these
projects, Ziets develops plans and strategies that reflect the
delicate balance between political, fiscal, legal, and financial realities. His client roster includes some of the US’s
most well-known sport facilities, including Oriole Park at
Camden Yards, Ameriquest Field, M&T Bank Stadium,
Miller Park, Paul Brown Stadium, Giants Stadium, the
Georgia Dome, Lincoln Financial Field, Citizens Bank
Ballpark, Great American Ballpark, Staples Center, Petco
Park, and proposed new buildings in Miami, Minnesota,
San Francisco, Virginia, Pittsburgh, and Oakland. In addition to these projects, Ziets has advised on collegiate facilities, minor league ballparks, horse racetracks, skating
facilities, convention centers, and hotels.
Ziets has also advised on a number of franchise acquisitions. Over the past 18 months, MZ Sports has advised on
successful acquisitions of the Los Angeles Dodgers,
Cleveland Cavaliers, Anaheim Mighty Ducks, and Georgia
Force (Arena Football League). For these transactions,
Ziets’ role includes due diligence, financial modeling,
structuring the purchase, and raising acquisition debt.
The following examples briefly highlight Ziets’ experience:
• Served as financial advisor and placement agent to
the San Diego Padres for their $1B new ballpark and
redevelopment project, which includes hotels,
offices, and retail development
• Advised the San Francisco 49ers on the financing
plan and negotiating strategy for their proposed new
stadium

•

Assisted the Philadelphia Eagles in negotiating
financing terms for their new football stadium and
practice facility
• Advised the Mayor of New York on new ballparks for
the Yankees and Mets—the most expensive sports
project (non-Olympics) in US history
• Advised one of the prospective purchasers of the
Boston Red Sox, the most expensive MLB franchise
acquisition in history
• Crafted the financial structure for the Brewers’ new
ballpark that achieved tax-exempt status through the
unprecedented use of joint ownership
• Implemented a creative forward swap for the
Maryland Stadium Authority that saved $15 million
(later used to bring football back to Baltimore)
Ziets received an MS in operations research from the
University of California, Berkeley, and is a graduate of the
Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, where
he received a BS in economics with a double major in
operations research and actuarial science. Ziets is a board
member of the Philadelphia Sports Congress. In 2000, he
was selected as one of the Top 40 Under Forty leaders in
the Philadelphia region by the Philadelphia Business
Journal and as one of the top Forty Under Forty Sports
Executives by the SportsBusiness Journal.

Role and Trends
Q: What are the essential skills needed for your job?
A: We run our company a bit differently from other firms
in our business. Often, sports advisors are part of an
investment bank or commercial bank and thus can rely on
their balance sheet to attract clients. As a boutique advisory firm, MZ Sports does not have that luxury. Therefore,
we have to go above and beyond in helping our clients
understand the business they are about to buy or the sta-
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dium effort they are about to undertake. To do this, we
implement a rigorous quantitative approach to ensure
that the client fully understands the financial impacts of
their particular project. Thus, strong quantitative skills are
a must. In addition, both our M&A and our stadium projects require a tremendous degree of creativity. We often
borrow ideas from other disciplines, be it media, real
estate, or municipal finance, to engineer deal structures. It
is rare that a deal in this space goes forward without running into some type of potential fatal flaw related to legal,
fiscal, or credit issues. For virtually every deal, we are looking at creative ways to reach our clients’ objective—implementing interest rate hedges, structuring debt to meet
League requirements, and developing creative structures
that enable low cost tax-exempt financing. The third skill
required is patience. We have a great respect for the
intense media scrutiny that come with these projects and
understand that stadium deals get played out over a long
period of time. Finally, as I often tell my wife, a key part of
our job is watching SportsCenter, although that is sometimes a tough sell.
Q: How did you “break into” sports?
A: Unlike most people in this business, I fell into it. As a
young analyst at a municipal financial advisory firm, I was
assigned to the sports group. This was back in 1988 when
there was little to no stadium activity in the US. My firm,
Public Financial Management, had just served as advisor
on Joe Robbie Stadium, the first privately financed stadium in 25 years. With one stadium under our belt, we were
the “expert” in this field. I happened to come on board at
the same time we were retained by the Maryland Stadium
Authority to structure the financing for a new ballpark for
the Orioles. As many people know, the success of Camden
Yards was a key factor in the new stadium renaissance. We
quickly became the go-to firm on stadium projects in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, when a large number of teams
were striving to develop new facilities.
Q: What are the typical steps for you when you begin and
complete a facility financing project? What is your role in
the process?
A: In planning new stadiums, we generally get in early
and work side by side with our clients all the way through
the process. First, we meet with our clients to understand
their overarching objectives, whether it involves value
4 Volume 1 • Number 1 • 2006 • IJSF

creation, cash flow, tax strategies, real estate development, or a media play, for example. Second, we spend a
large amount of time understanding the issues and constraints specific to that project. This will involve a thorough investigation of legal matters with the team’s
counsel and local bond counsel, debt constraints as they
relate to both the team and the public sector, credit
issues, and public sector fiscal constraints. Third, we
undertake a thorough review of public funding options,
identifying and analyzing various funding alternatives.
This will include diving three layers deep into the public
sector’s financial records to develop refinancing scenarios
that will benefit the project. With my background in
municipal finance, teams rely on MZ Sports to help them
get their arms around the public’s labyrinthian financing
structure. Fourth, we develop very detailed new stadium
pro formas for the team to help them understand what
they can afford, based on their objectives. These pro formas have a variety of constituents—teams, the leagues
which must approve these transactions, and lenders.
Fifth, we will provide background information on comparative deals—both lease terms and financing plans—to
help our clients understand how they stack up with their
counterparts. Sixth, we advise our clients in all aspects of
the lease and development agreement negotiation and
support our position with financing models showing the
public sector how they can afford their contribution.
Seventh, we develop the team’s private financing plan.
Eighth, we assist in negotiations with project vendors—
concessionaires, for example—to ensure consistency with
the financing plan. Finally, MZ Sports will execute the
team’s financing plan including advising on lender selection and negotiating terms including derivative products.
Q: What are the recent trends in sports facility financing?
A: First and foremost, stadium financing plans are driven
by the ability to garner public funding for a project. Over
the past five years, the trend has been towards more private capital. This is due to a general disdain for public
funding of these projects, significant increases in project
cost, and the fact that the teams pursuing stadiums during the past five years have tended to be in larger markets,
where the teams have less leverage (i.e., they cannot justify threats to relocate). Second, because of the demand for
increased private capital, teams are exploring the poten-
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tial for real estate development opportunities linked to
new stadiums as a means to improve the salability of a
project to the public as well as increase the financial viability. We have seen this with recently opened or contemplated projects for the Padres, Lions, Coyotes, Nets,
49ers, Chargers, Anaheim (NFL stadium), and A’s. Third,
public entities are showing increasing willingness to
finance, but not fund, the private contribution. What I
mean by that is that a governmental agency will issue and
secure debt funded by team revenue streams such as rent
payments. Compared to a private financing through a
team related entity, this lowers the team’s cost of capital,
frees up its balance sheet, and extends the debt term.
Finally, monoline bond insurers, which guarantee payment of debt service, are increasingly playing in this
space, opening up sports projects to a whole new set of
buyers—institutions that play in the ‘AAA’ market.
Q: What changes do you see in the future with regards to
sports facility financing?
A: The combination of increased facility costs, less public
funding, and team debt limits imposed by the respective
leagues will require teams to continue to be creative in
raising capital. As opposed to one series of senior debt, we
will see more tranched debt, including mezzanine debt,
holding company loans, vendor loans, and debt against
real estate projects tied to stadiums. In addition, we will
continue to see the proliferation of new buyers of this
debt, including hedge funds. Finally, with large debt levels, teams will expect their CFOs to undertake appropriate matching of assets and liabilities though floating rate
debt and derivative products where appropriate, much
like their corporate brethren. We have recently advised
three teams on derivatives to take advantage of the current interest rate environment. Mezzanine debt is subordinate, unsecured debt. Thus, it is riskier than senior
secured debt, which gets paid first, both in terms of ongoing operations and in a bankruptcy. As a result, mezz
debt lenders require a higher cost of capital. Tranched
debt in this context is simply multiple series of debt. Each
series may be similarly secured and just issued at different
times and in different amounts to either take advantage
of the prevailing interest rate environment or to allow for
flexible borrowing needs (i.e., the borrower may not need

the full amount of the committed bank funding depending on actual project costs).
Q: As the professional sports facility market in the US
slows down, how do you see the college sport facility market differing?
A: From a financing perspective, NCAA venues differ from
professional facilities in several ways. First, it is much more
difficult to finance these buildings privately—through stadium revenues—as these buildings generally cannot come
close to generating sufficient revenues to warrant project
debt. Again, this is generally the case, but there are exceptions in the case of large conference football or basketball
programs. Second, there is no deep pockets owner to backstop the debt or the construction risk, again reducing the
feasibility of a successful private financing. Third, universities have different financing vehicles at their disposal
including using the athletic department budget, the university budget, student fees, or state entities to guarantee
debt. Finally, alums can provide a significant portion of the
required capital. We happen to subscribe to the theory that
NCAA institutions should at least explore the viability of
project debt, either as a standalone financing tool or in
concert with other forms of university debt in order to
minimize the impact on the university’s balance sheet.
Q: What about the international market?
A: The international market, we believe, will be the hot
facility financing market in the coming years. My sense is
that it is still a few years away but when it hits, there will be
a tremendous amount of activity. Most of this activity will
be in the asset backed, syndicated loan, or project finance
markets. The municipal bond market and tax-exempt debt
is unique to the United States; thus, I do not see public
entities doing much in the way of backing sport facilities.
We are starting to see this in the United Kingdom with soccer facilities. As with any project financing, these projects
will be required to stand on their own merits. It will be
interesting to watch how the natural conflict between
emerging markets, which need credit support, and the lack
of interest in public participation, plays out.

Details
Q: How is the cost of capital calculated for these investment projects?
Volume 1 • Number 1 • 2006 • IJSF 5
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A: For private debt, the cost of capital will be a function
of the deal structure and credit rating. For a construction
loan, these projects will price at a spread to LIBOR consistent with credit quality. Not surprisingly, for a team or
owner backed loan, the pricing will be less than a nonrecourse project financing (i.e., a loan whereby the lender
has a pledge of new building revenue streams only). If the
debt is long-term fixed rate private placement, the debt
will price with a spread to treasuries consistent with rating, in this case generally “BBB” category. For an insured
deal, we are looking at a much lower spread due to a
“AAA” rating.
Q: When is bond insurance used? What are the criteria
and cost implications of using it?
A: The use of bond insurance is a good example of
deploying a product from another line of business. In this
case, we borrowed from the municipal bond business.
Roughly 50-60% of all muni deals are insured by a small
group of monoline bond insurers. These insurers guarantee prompt payment of principal and interest to bondholders. In 1997, AMBAC, one of the largest bond
insurers, guaranteed debt for America West Arena in
Phoenix. This was quickly followed by another AMBAC
deal, this time for the financing of Bank One Ballpark for
the Arizona Diamondbacks. Since that time, bond insurance has been used for a number of sports projects.
Without bond insurance, the strongest stadium projects
are generally rated in the ‘BBB’ category. Bond insurance
brings ‘AAA’ ratings to the project and thus increases
investor demand for this paper to include buyers of high
grade debt. Bond insurers will only take on the strongest
projects, however, as they require investment grade ratings by two rating agencies. Generally, we have found that
bond insurance is cost effective when available (i.e., the
annual or upfront premium is more than offset by the
reduced cost of capital).
Q: It often appears that maintenance costs are severely
underestimated. Is that the case and if so, why?
A: There are several reasons. First, in the early years teams
are spending “maintenance” dollars on items that were initially in the stadium construction budget but were value
engineered out. Second, there is little to no long-term
experience of new stadiums to fall back on when estimating annual capex. Third, to keep up with the newest build6 Volume 1 • Number 1 • 2006 • IJSF

ings and remain fresh, teams are funding improvements in
their buildings well beyond normal maintenance.
Q: Can you describe the details of how the forward swap
deal with the Maryland Stadium Authority works?
A: The Authority issued debt in a high interest rate environment in 1989. Most issuers would simply refinance
the debt once rates were low, much as you or I would do
with our mortgage. However, in the municipal bond
market, investors have call protection, generally for 10
years. This means that even with low rates, you cannot
refinance any of the debt due within 10 years. Most
municipal issuers simply advance refund the bonds—
refinance the bonds in advance of 10 years with the better economics starting in year 11. However, we could not
even advance refund the bonds due to legal constraints
under which the Authority issued the debt. The Authority
had to wait until 1999. Our problem was that we needed
funds well in advance of 1999 to fund a football stadium.
The solution was a forward starting swap where the
Authority would enter into the swap in 1999 but receive
the economics of the swap six years earlier. The basics of
the swap are as follows: (i) the Authority would refinance
the debt in 1999 with floating rate debt; (ii) the swap
counterparty would pay the Authority a floating rate
equal to the floating rate on the Authority’s debt; (iii) the
Authority would pay a fixed rate to the swap counterparty at the current bond rate, but because this bond rate was
higher than the 1993 market would suggest, the swap
counterparty paid the Authority on a one-time basis the
present value of these higher than market rates.
Q: Hotel or restaurant taxes are often part of the mix of
public financing sources. Is a decrease in units sold
(because of the higher tax rate and total price) considered
when determining the increase in taxes generated by raising the tax rate? If so, how is it calculated?
A: Although unproven, it is generally felt that a small
increase in a city’s hotel, rental car, or restaurant taxes
have virtually no impact on units sold. Keep in mind that
when convention planners select a city, tax rates are one
of many criteria considered. Location, convention center
space, hotel room availability, convention center work
rules, cultural amenities, air fares, CVB programs, and
assistance all play a large role. Having said that, the bigger impact is the opportunity cost of these tax increases
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(i.e., they cannot be used for other public projects). The
bottom line is there is no free lunch.
Q: What are the major risks from the institution’s perspective when choosing to finance a sports facility? How are
those risks mitigated or managed?
A: The major risks include construction risk and performance risk in the form of generating sufficient revenues to cover debt service and reach coverage covenants.
Embedded in the performance risk includes premium
seat renewal risk, ticket sales, and the risk of a naming
rights partner defaulting or disappearing. Construction
risks are mitigated through a combination of project contingency funds, owner guarantees for overrun payments,
insurance, and an appropriate project delivery mechanism including a guaranteed max price contract and
other cost controls. Performance risk is mitigated
through coverage covenants, performance reserve funds
to limit renewal risk, and controls by the lender in the
event of defaults.
Q: In general, what criteria are used to pick the public
financing sources used for a project from among the many
available (e.g., hotel, restaurant, car rental, sin, sales, general fund, etc.)?
A: Not surprisingly, the optimal funding sources vary by
municipality. We focus on the following criteria in selecting the optimal funding source: availability, ability to
increase the tax, referendum requirements, competing
uses for that funding source, legal and financial restrictions, political considerations, and public reaction. For
example, in California, Prop 218 requires a referendum
with 2/3 approval for a tax increase if the tax is used for a
specific project. Thus, tax increases are frankly not feasible. However, California is one of the few states whereby
the local municipality keeps 100% of the hotel tax. Thus,
hotel tax revenues, not tax increases, are more feasible as
a funding source in California than many other states.
This is how the Padres’ ballpark was funded.
Q: What are the keys to success in making a public/private
partnership work and getting the surrounding economic
development to take hold?
A: Public/private partnerships work when there is a level
of trust and both sides have the same objectives. Where
one side is trying to crush the other in a negotiation for
no other reason than bragging rights, the deal is destined

to fail. Surrounding economic development, as we have
found in many instances, cannot be forced. Rather, market forces will determine if development around stadiums makes sense.

Examples
Q: On that note, please take us inside the City of San
Diego and Padres “Baseball Village” joint venture project.
The San Diego ballpark development looks like it will be
the most successful private-public partnership yet. What
were/are the keys to success? How were they able to induce
so much private sector involvement (new Omni Hotel,
office space, residential housing, etc)?
A: Success was predicated on two factors. First, the city
invested close to $300M in the ballpark, at that time the
most ever by a municipality for a sports project. In
return, the city put our feet to the fire in terms of development. This came in the form of tax incentives tied to
development as well as specific development requirements for retail, residential, and hotel units. Thus, the
Padres had to keep their eye on the ball in terms of development—a different agreement with the city may have
resulted in less development. Second, the market, which
fell away in the late 1990s and early this decade, has come
back with a vengeance, allowing the Padres to not only
fulfill their development requirements, but surpass them.
We should keep in mind, however, that the Padres did
not want the development obligation due to the tremendous risk. You cannot force development if it does not
make economic sense. Fortunately, in this case it did.
Actually, the tax incentives came in two forms. First, the
Padres are required to pay property taxes on the ballpark.
In return for the team increasing its investment in the
ballpark, the city agreed to utilize tax increment financing
(“TIF”) to help fund the project. Under a TIF, the property taxes paid by the Padres are used to finance a portion
of the project under the theory that the taxes are only
available due to the ballpark. Thus, only “incremental”
taxes are used to pay debt service, no existing city taxes
are used. The second use of tax incentives involved the
development around the ballpark. The first $3.5M of
taxes generated from this development stay with the ballpark to fund operating expenses. Without this developVolume 1 • Number 1 • 2006 • IJSF 7
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ment, the team would be on the hook to fund these
expenses.
Q: There have been numerous facility deals in which the
incentives between the team and local government were
misaligned. For instance, suppose a team is responsible for
selling PSLs and season tickets, and shares the PSL revenues with the local government as part of the financing
deal, but keeps 100% of the season ticket revenue. It is not
surprising to see the team not sell PSLs at all or at a very
low price, so it can charge a higher price on season tickets
because it gets to keep more of the overall revenue this way.
Further, suppose the local government is responsible for
selling PSLs and the team is responsible for selling season
tickets, each getting to keep all of its own revenues. Because
the financial stakeholders are separate, each party has an
incentive to price its product higher than would be the case
if one party were setting both prices and sharing revenues.
The result is that the combined price is too high to sell all of
the PSLs and season tickets. Are these types of incentive
misalignments being recognized and more incentive compatible structures being put into place or should we continue to expect to see problems in this area?
A: There is now an established history of how to best
structure these deals and also what types of structures to
avoid. Clearly, the scenarios described in this question
represent less than optimal structures. We have seen,
mostly in situations where the public sector still runs the
building, a misalignment of risk and reward as well as
improperly placed incentives. More and more, teams are
receiving all of the revenues and paying all of the operating expenses as well as funding their stadium investment
upfront. This avoids any gaming of the system which
hurts both parties and often the fan.
Q: The value of facilities is often a contentious issue.
Sometimes “canned” estimates of a limited array of
potential values from consultants are presented that typically address totals, rather than value added. Then an
intensely critical atmosphere evolves. The public is left
with imprecise information on what they are getting for
their tax dollars. Why don’t facilities planners solicit the
following: (1) an independent panel to frame the analysis,
and (2) independent estimates as framed by such a panel
of the value of their endeavors along the three lines of
value—economic activity value, development value, and
8 Volume 1 • Number 1 • 2006 • IJSF

quality of life value? Then, the public wouldn’t be suspicious of the results and more people might be in favor of
the public financing.
A: You raise an interesting idea. We have long been of the
belief that ever rising stadium costs are one of the largest
public relations problems these projects have. However,
there are a number of good reasons why independent
panels have not been asked to value project costs. First,
the team owner makes change orders throughout the
project, driving up costs. Second, these buildings have
become architectural statements and thus, neither side
wants to be restricted on cost. Third, with the teams
almost always taking cost overrun responsibility, they
want the freedom to raise costs and change the design as
they see fit. I do think, however, that with more realistic
cost estimates from the start, you eliminate a lot of the
partisan rhetoric.
Q: What was the most challenging project you have ever
done and why?
A: The Padres ballpark was the most challenging. We were
dealing with a small market team, a difficult site, a limit on
public funding due to Prop 218, a city which appeared to
be inflexible once we had to diverge from the initial
financing plan (cost overruns, delays, etc.), onerous development requirements, and serial litigation that delayed
the project two years. Despite this, the Padres succeeded
in completing the ballpark and creating a model on how a
ballpark can reinvigorate a neighborhood.

Future Research
Q: What are some of the big unanswered questions in
sport facility finance that you wish you had answers to?
A: I would like to see either better research on actual
experience as it relates to economic impacts of new buildings or research that includes non-quantifiable impacts
such as cultural benefits or notoriety that a team provides
a city. It appears to me that the naysayers always seem to
get their message out as to how these projects do not provide benefits to cities and my feeling is that this is simply
not true when you include the macro aspects.

